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Legal governance and regulation are becoming increasingly reliant on data
collection and algorithmic data processing. In the area of copyright, online protection of digitized works is frequently mediated by algorithmic enforcement systems
intended to purge illicit content and limit the liability of YouTube, Facebook, and
other content platforms. But unauthorized content is not necessarily illicit content.
Many unauthorized digital postings may claim legitimacy under statutory exceptions like the legal balancing standard known as fair use. Such exceptions exist to
ameliorate the negative effects of copyright on public discourse, personal enrichment,
and artistic creativity. Consequently, it may seem desirable to incorporate fair use
metrics into copyright policing algorithms, both to protect against automated overdeterrence and to inform users of their compliance with copyright law. In this Essay,
I examine the prospects for algorithmic mediation of copyright exceptions, warning
that the design values embedded in algorithms will inevitably become embedded in
public behavior and consciousness. Thus, algorithmic fair use carries with it the
very real possibility of habituating new media participants to its own biases and so
progressively altering the fair use standard it attempts to embody.

INTRODUCTION
Law, like other human artifacts, is costly to produce, to distribute, and to apply. Like other human artifacts, the marginal
cost of law benefits from economies of scale; standardized, onesize-fits-all regulations can be economically produced and promulgated, with perhaps, like a made-to-measure suit, a bit of tailoring at the end of the supply chain by a court or other arbiter. But
even moderate judicial tailoring adds enormously to the cost of
applied law, and rare instances of bespoke regulation are even
more socially costly. 1

† Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine; 2017–2018 US-UK
Fulbright Cybersecurity Scholar. My thanks to members of the Oxford Internet Institute’s
Digital Ethics Lab, participants in the Cambridge Faculty of Law CIPIL Intellectual Property
Seminar Series, participants in the session on “Data Commons, Privacy, and Law” at the
ECREA Digital Culture and Communication Section Conference, as well as to Oren Bracha,
Pamela Samuelson, and participants in the CyberProf listserv conversation on algorithmic
fair use for helpful discussion in preparation of this Essay. Portions of this research were
made possible by support from the US-UK Fulbright Commission.
1
See generally Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 Harv L Rev 1684 (1966).
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This Symposium examines the proposition that technological
advances might dramatically lower the cost of bespoke regulation.
The potential for such “personalized law” is dependent on the development of ubiquitous data collection and algorithmic data processing coupled with dramatically lower costs in real-time communication. 2 Applications of these technologies have emerged in
numerous areas, including criminal law, immigration, taxation,
and contract. 3 In the area of copyright, protection of digitized
works is already increasingly mediated by algorithmic enforcement systems that are intended to effectuate the rights of copyright owners while simultaneously limiting the liability of content
intermediaries. On YouTube, Google, and many other online platforms, both internet service providers (ISPs) and copyright owners
have deployed detection and removal algorithms that are intended
to purge illicit content from their sites. 4
But unauthorized content is not necessarily illicit content. In
particular, many unauthorized digital postings may claim legal
legitimacy under one or more exceptions to the rights of the copyright holder, most notably under the legal balancing standard
known as fair use. 5 Exceptions such as fair use exist to ameliorate
the negative effects of exclusive control over expression on public
discourse, personal enrichment, and artistic creativity. Consequently, it may seem desirable to incorporate context-specific fair
2
See Natascha Just and Michael Latzer, Governance by Algorithms: Reality Construction by Algorithmic Selection on the Internet, 39 Media, Culture & Society 238, 247–
48 (2017) (describing algorithmic personalization); Paul Dourish, Algorithms and Their
Others: Algorithmic Culture in Context, 3 Big Data & Society *3 (July–Dec 2016) (discussing
algorithms in the context of digital automation). As Professor Paul Dourish points out, the
concept of the “algorithm” is slippery, and usage is loose, encompassing everything from
actual computer code to systems of digital control and management. Id at *3–4. Because
the idea of a “fair use algorithm” currently lies somewhere between conjecture and fantasy,
making it impossible to predict just what technology might accommodate such a system,
I use the term here in the broad sense of “encoded procedures for transforming input data
into a desired output, based on specified calculations.” Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance
of Algorithms, in Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo J. Boczkowski, and Kirsten A. Foot, eds, Media
Technologies: Essays on Communication, Materiality, and Society 167, 167 (MIT 2014).
3
See generally Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That
Control Money and Information (Harvard 2015) (surveying use of algorithmic controls
across multiple sectors).
4
See Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright
Law, 93 Notre Dame L Rev 499, 543–44 (2017); Maayan Perel and Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 Stan Tech L Rev 473, 478–81 (2016);
Annemarie Bridy, Copyright’s Digital Deputies: DMCA-Plus Enforcement by Internet Intermediaries, in John A. Rothchild, ed, Research Handbook on Electronic Commerce Law 185,
195–98 (Edward Elgar 2016).
5
See 17 USC § 107.
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use metrics into copyright-policing algorithms, both to protect
against automated overdeterrence and to inform users of their
compliance with copyright law. 6 Fair use was intended to “personalize” copyright to individual contexts; hence the question arises
whether old-style statutory personalization can be translated into
data-driven, machine-mediated personalization.
In this Essay, I examine the prospects for personalized law,
taking the outlook for algorithmic mediation of fair use as a vehicle. A large and growing literature on algorithmic regulation already warns us of the pitfalls inherent in reliance on such technology, including ersatz objectivity, diminished decisional
transparency, and design biases. 7 Drawing on this literature, I
argue that automated implementation of legal standards is problematic as a practical and technical matter, and these limitations
will inevitably serve to shape user expectations regarding the processes they govern. It seems clear that this effect is already occurring in conjunction with automated enforcement of copyright, as
the design values embedded in automated systems become embedded in public behavior and consciousness. Thus, algorithmic
fair use carries with it the very real possibility of habituating new
media participants to its own biases and so progressively altering
the fair use standard it attempts to embody. Critical analysis of
algorithmic fair use offers a cautionary tale that should give us
pause, not only regarding the development of such systems but
also regarding the development of algorithmic law generally.
I. COPYRIGHT’S FAIR USE STANDARD
Copyright allows authors to restrict reproduction, performance, and related uses of their original works as a pecuniary
incentive. 8 But copyright, like any property right, is never absolute. Jurisdictional copyright systems typically include some
number of user privileges or exemptions—circumstances under
6
See Sag, 93 Notre Dame L Rev at 522–26 (cited in note 4); Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair
Use by Design, 64 UCLA L Rev 1082, 1093–99 (2017).
7
See, for example, danah boyd and Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data:
Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 Info, Commun
& Society 662, 667–75 (2012) (surveying the challenges attending deployment of big data
systems); Gernot Rieder and Judith Simon, Big Data: A New Empiricism and Its Epistemic
and Socio-political Consequences, in Wolfgang Pietsch, Jörg Wernecke, and Maximillian
Ott, eds, Berechenbarkeit der Welt? Philosophie und Wissenschaft im Zeitalter von Big
Data 85, 91–94 (Springer 2017).
8
See Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of First
Principles, 8 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 397, 401 (2012).
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which the statute will condone or authorize particular uses of a
copyrighted work even if the copyright owner has not done so.9
These vary between jurisdictions but typically cluster around socially beneficial uses of the work, such as education, news reporting, scholarship, personal enrichment, or public commentary.10
Often known in British Commonwealth countries as “fair dealing”
provisions, these exceptions to the authorization of the copyright
holder entail a specific laundry list of discrete, statutorily defined
circumstances under which a protected work can be used without
permission.
In the United States, the Copyright Act 11 also includes a number of such discrete statutory carve outs. For example, § 110 of the
statute allows otherwise unauthorized performances of certain nondramatic works for classroom instruction, or for religious services,
or for the benefit of blind or handicapped persons. 12 Section 110
also permits uses that might or might not be judged socially beneficial but that, in any event, were judged by Congress for whatever reason to be statutorily permissible without the authorization of the copyright holder, such as the “performance of a
nondramatic musical work by a governmental body or a nonprofit
agricultural or horticultural organization, in the course of an annual agricultural or horticultural fair or exhibition conducted by
such body or organization.” 13
Additionally, the United States, together with a small handful of other nations, includes in its copyright limitations an indeterminate exception known as “fair use.” 14 Codified into the current statute from common law precedent, fair use is not
categorically or specifically defined but rather is decided based on
adjudicatory assessment of four factors. Roughly speaking, a
court determining whether an otherwise infringing use might be
fair is to consider how much of the work was taken, what was
done with it, what kind of work was subjected to the taking, and
9

See Pamela Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limitations and Exceptions,
in Ruth L. Okediji, ed, Copyright Law in an Age of Limitations and Exceptions 12, 18–24
(Cambridge 2017).
10 P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Fierce Creatures—Copyright Exemptions: Toward Extinction?, in David Vaver, ed, 2 Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law 231, 232
(Routledge 2006).
11 Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (1976), codified at 17 USC § 101 et seq.
12 17 USC § 110(1), (3), (8).
13 17 USC § 110(6).
14 17 USC § 107. See also Jennifer M. Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 27 Berkeley Tech L J 1379, 1429 n 219 (2012) (noting similar provisions in Israeli and Philippine law).
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what effect the taking likely had on the market for the work.15
Determination as to whether unauthorized use of a copyright
work falls under this provision varies from situation to situation
depending on the contextual assessment of the four factors.
Copyright’s multifactor fair use balancing test thus presents
a classic example of what has been dubbed a legal standard.16
Scholars have long divided legal imperatives into the categories
of “rules” and “standards,” the former constituting discrete and
defined legal requirements and the latter constituting malleable
and fact-dependent directions. These have reciprocal virtues and
vices. Rules are simple to understand and enforce but lack nuance
and flexibility; standards are flexible and context-sensitive but
lack clarity. Institutionally, rules tend to be promulgated ex ante
by legislative enactment; standards tend to be determined ex post
by courts or other adjudicatory fora. The major institutional costs
for rules are typically incurred in development in advance of administration; the major institutional costs for standards are typically incurred during enforcement or administration. 17
In an influential discussion of the topic, Professor Carol Rose
noted that these are typically not distinct modes of imperative but
lie on a continuum, and legal imperatives tend to process between
the two. 18 Because formal rules are too rigid to fairly accommodate unforeseen circumstances, they tend to accumulate exceptions until they begin to resemble standards. At the same time,
because standards are expensive to administer, adjudicators
begin to develop shortcuts or per se doctrines that are automatically applied when certain recurring circumstances arise, creating de facto rules. Thus, regulation incorporates some combination of ready-to-wear and bespoke regulation, reaping the cost
savings from legal economies of scale while attempting to minimize the pinch or the gaps that result from one-size-fits all.

15

17 USC § 107.
See, for example, Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining under Rules versus Standards,
11 J L Econ & Org 256, 269–70 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J, 557, 575–77 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33
UCLA L Rev 379, 381–83 (1985).
17 See Kaplow, 42 Duke L J at 599–601 (cited in note 16) (discussing how context can
change the cost of rule development or standard application).
18 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan L Rev 577, 601–04
(1988). Although they do not use Rose’s terminology, some scholars have observed the
same modulating effect in fair use doctrine. See Niva Elkin-Koren and Orit FischmanAfori, Rulifying Fair Use, 59 Ariz L Rev 161, 177–86 (2017) (discussing the procession
between rules and standards in fair use).
16
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Fair use and similar standards represent attempts by the institutional legal system to personalize copyright usage by allowing
a tribunal to take into account the individualized circumstances
of the unauthorized use, after the fact, in rendering a decision on
infringement. As with other standards-based legal doctrine, fair
use carries with it the disadvantage of ex ante uncertainty; no one
can be entirely certain in advance how a court will weigh the four
factors, and hence there is always some apprehension that a use
may be found infringing rather than fair. Risk averse content users, unable to confidently predict the ultimate decision on their
activities, may forgo some socially beneficial uses. But at the
same time, this strategy extends copyright exceptions to new or
unforeseen scenarios that the legislature would have been unable
to anticipate under a discrete “fair dealing” approach.
II. ALGORITHMIC COPYRIGHT
Recent commentary has argued that the doctrinal deployment of rules and standards either has come to an end or will be
drastically altered by imminent changes in technological cost
structures. 19 This change is expected to be driven by ubiquitous
data collection and algorithmic data processing, coupled with dramatically lower costs of communication. The argument postulates
a coming world of “microdirectives,” in which automated systems
supply citizens with tailored directives, thus capturing both the ex
ante advantages of rules and the ex post advantages of standards.20
Such speculations likely overstate any foreseeable capability
of the relevant technology and certainly understate the role of
other social agents in the deployment and implementation of algorithmic systems. 21 Perhaps not surprisingly, this vision of personalized law largely replicates the neoclassical economist’s nirvana of zero transaction costs and perfect information by
postulating a world in which data-processing and communication
technologies realize the simplifying assumptions of the simplest
19 See generally Anthony J. Casey and Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and
Standards, 92 Ind L J 1401 (2017); Anthony J. Casey and Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving
Laws, 66 U Toronto L J 429 (2016).
20 See Casey and Niblett, 92 Ind L J at 1411–12 (cited in note 19).
21 See Lucas D. Introna, Algorithms, Governance, and Governmentality: On Governing Academic Writing, 41 Sci, Tech & Hum Values 17, 20 (2015) (describing algorithmic
governance mechanisms as embedded in a complex flow of social practices); Kate Crawford, Can an Algorithm Be Agonistic? Ten Scenes from Life in Calculated Publics, 41 Sci,
Tech & Hum Values 77, 79 (2015) (observing that algorithms function, are produced, and
are modified in complex political environments).
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economic models. As in much of the hypothetical discussion surrounding big data and artificial intelligence, this speculation partakes of the “magic[al]” worldview 22 of trending technology, which
promises costless production without the disadvantageous investment of time and resources that technological activity inevitably
entails. 23
A more grounded framing for algorithmic fair use, then, is to
ask whether old-style legal personalization can be translated into
data-driven, machine-mediated personalization. Clearly technical
practice is already trending in such a direction. Commentators such
as Professor Matthew Sag have observed that such algorithmic
agents are already commonly deployed to detect and effectively
determine cases of digital copyright infringement. 24 In some cases,
such agents are deployed by copyright-intensive industries, such
as the recorded music or motion picture industries, to trawl the
internet for potentially unauthorized copies of their proprietary
works in order to enforce their copyright. 25 In other cases these
search devices are deployed by intermediaries, such as YouTube,
to remove or deter infringing copies so as to avoid contributory
liability, meet their obligations as content hosts, and maintain an
ostensible public image of vigilance against lawlessness. 26
Sag argues that online algorithmic policing has already
changed the nature of copyright enforcement and so effectively
changed the nature of copyright infringement. 27 Identification
and removal of allegedly infringing content is automated, and human oversight or involvement in the removal process is infrequent and perfunctory. Algorithmic removal decisions are seldom
challenged due to severe cost asymmetries. Automated identification and removal, whether accurate or mistaken, is relatively
cheap, whereas legal and institutional engagement is comparatively expensive. Most removal decisions are effectively final, and

22 M.C. Elish and danah boyd, Situating Methods in the Magic of Big Data and AI,
85 Commun Monographs 57, 63–64 (2017). See also Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn, Marcel
Goguen, and Tony Porter, Big Data and Algorithmic Governance: The Case of Financial
Practices, 22 New Polit Econ 219, 220 (2016) (labeling as “techno-utopian” the optimistic
view that algorithmic governance will “overcome the imperfections of politics and faulty
forms of knowledge”).
23 See Alfred Gell, Technology and Magic, 4 Anthropology Today 6, 9 (1988).
24 See Sag, 93 Notre Dame L Rev at 543–44 (cited in note 4).
25 Id at 543–44.
26 Id at 545–46.
27 Id at 504–05, 543–44.
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all the parties involved—whether users, service providers, or content owners—have altered their legal expectations in light of
these realities. 28
Copyright enforcement algorithms typically make no provision for user privileges or exceptions, and the removal decision is
effectively final before the dispute reaches any forum in which
defenses such as fair use might be considered. Thus, far from
greater personalization of the copyright notice and takedown procedure, the cost structure of algorithmic content policing has created a largely impersonal process, in which the context-specific
factors that should be taken into account in fair use analysis are
absent and go unconsidered. The question then arises whether
automated copyright policing can and should incorporate determinations of fair use or other statutory exceptions. 29
III. AUTOMATING FAIR USE ANALYSIS
Such questions are implicated in decisions like the opinion of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lenz v Universal Music Corp.30
Lenz posted to the video platform YouTube a twenty-nine-second
clip of her baby dancing to the Prince song “Let’s Go Crazy,” which
is heard playing distantly in the background audio of the clip. 31 The
unauthorized use of the music was detected by the recording label,
resulting in a demand under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act 32 (DMCA) that it be removed from the platform and leading
to a countersuit by Lenz over the propriety of the demand. 33 A
major legal question in the case was whether Universal had a
“good faith belief” that the clip was infringing before demanding

28 Sag, 93 Notre Dame L Rev at 503 (cited in note 4). See also Roger Brownsword,
Lost in Translation: Legality, Regulatory Margins, and Technological Management, 26
Berkeley Tech L J 1321, 1328–29 (2011) (noting that technological regulation measures
allow only nonnormative practical responses). Thus, while Professor Karen Yeung argues
that digital content filtering is a tool of identification and selection rather than control,
students of Foucault understand that identification and selection technologies are indeed
control technologies. Compare Karen Yeung, Toward an Understanding of Regulation by
Design, in Roger Brownsword and Karen Yeung, eds, Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes 79, 88 (Hart 2008), with Oscar H. Gandy
Jr, The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information 71–80 (Westview 1993)
(extending Foucault’s observations on surveillance to data mining technologies).
29 See Sag, 93 Notre Dame L Rev at 531–32 (cited in note 4); Elkin-Koren, 64 UCLA
L Rev at 1093–99 (cited in note 6).
30 815 F3d 1145 (9th Cir 2016).
31 Id at 1149.
32 Pub L No 105-304, 112 Stat 2860 (1998).
33 Lenz, 815 F3d at 1150.
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that it be taken down from the platform. 34 Arguably, the formation of such a belief would require some consideration of fair
use or other copyright exceptions because the use could not be
infringing if excused by such exceptions.
The court held that consideration of fair use was required before demanding removal of online content. 35 But clearly with the
use of automated detection and removal algorithms in mind, the
court continued: “We note, without passing judgment, that the
implementation of computer algorithms appears to be a valid and
good faith middle ground for processing a plethora of content
while still meeting the DMCA’s requirements to somehow consider fair use.” 36
Perhaps not surprisingly, the court later withdrew this particular passage of dicta from the published opinion. The record
label’s copyright enforcement search and judgment in Lenz was
done manually, 37 and it is unclear whether fair use consideration
can in fact be automated. In 2001, Professor Julie Cohen and I
argued in the context of secured copyrighted content that, because fair use standards could not be programmed into technical
protection systems, some type of human oversight or institutional
infrastructure would be required to ensure continued access for
such uses. 38 Prominent computer scientists similarly expressed
their deep skepticism that fair use could be programmed into a
technical system. 39 Much of this skepticism was based on the ability or inability to translate inchoate legal imperatives into executable computer code. 40 These challenges would include not only
the limitation of human programmers to define the parameters and
34

Id at 1151.
Id at 1153.
36 Lenz v Universal Music Corp, 801 F3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir 2015). This passage was
withdrawn and superseded by Lenz, 815 F3d at 1148.
37 Lenz, 815 F3d at 1149.
38 Dan L. Burk and Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management
Systems, 15 Harv J L & Tech 41, 55–58 (2001). See also Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital
Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 Harv J L & Tech 49, 82–85 (2006)
(critiquing the Burk and Cohen proposal).
39 See, for example, John S. Erickson, Fair Use, DRM, and Trusted Computing, 46
Commun ACM 34, 37–38 (2003); Edward W. Felten, A Skeptical View of DRM and Fair
Use, 46 Commun ACM 57, 58 (2003). See also Deirdre Mulligan and Aaron Burstein, Implementing Copyright Limitations in Rights Expression Languages, in Joan Feigenbaum,
ed, Digital Rights Management—ACM CCS-9 Workshop 137, 140–41 (Springer 2002) (discussing the possibilities for expression of automated fair use permissions).
40 See John S. Erickson and Deirdre K. Mulligan, The Technical and Legal Dangers
of Code-Based Fair Use Enforcement, 92 Proceedings of the IEEE 985, 992 (2004) (observing
that “copyright law is difficult (if not impossible) to reduce to code”).
35
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characteristics of legal texts but also the inherent limitations of
computer languages, their operating environments, and the capabilities of the hardware available to execute coded instructions. 41
In particular, the ex ante indeterminacy of a legal standard
such as fair use, which in the institutional operation of the law
constitutes a benefit, presents a challenge for operational machine coding. 42 Rule-oriented legal imperatives may better lend
themselves to automated instructions. It is perhaps not too farfetched to imagine a programmable exception of the fair dealing
laundry list sort—although even for supposedly discrete statutory
exceptions, concepts like “educational use” or “news reporting”
might be unexpectedly tricky to reduce to computable code. But
one can, for example, imagine programming a system to determine, perhaps on the basis of geolocational data and scraped calendaring or advertising data, whether a nondramatic musical
work is being performed at an agricultural fair. 43 It is far more
difficult to envision how one might program a system to determine whether a given use has a relevant degree of impact on the
actual or potential market for the work being used or whether an
excerpt from the work is so significant as to constitute the “heart”
of an author’s creation. 44
Thus, the prospects for deploying what Fred von Lohmann
has called “a judge on a chip” are at best remote. 45 Current machine learning techniques attempt to sidestep such difficulties by
creating routines that recognize data patterns and by allowing
the routine to operate according to the values in the pattern
found, rather than attempting to specify values in advance. 46 This

41

See id; Mulligan and Burstein, Digital Rights Management at 144 (cited in note 39).
See Elish and boyd, 85 Commun Monographs at 73 (cited in note 22) (“Because
computational systems require precise definitions and mathematically sound logics, sociocultural phenomena that are typically nuanced and fuzzy are rendered in coarse ways
when implemented into code.”).
43 See note 13 and accompanying text.
44 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 564–65
(1985) (holding that an unauthorized publication of a short excerpt constituting the “heart”
of a biography weighed against fair use).
45 See Mulligan and Burstein, Digital Rights Management at 139 (cited in note 39),
quoting Fred von Lohmann, Reconciling DRM and Fair Use: Preserving Future Fair Uses?
*1 (Computers, Freedom, and Privacy Conference, 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/
UF8R-VHZP. See also Armstrong, 20 Harv J L & Tech at 108–20 (cited in note 38) (reviewing limitations of a range of embedded fair use architecture possibilities).
46 See Elish and boyd, Commun Monographs at 63 (cited in note 22) (describing the
current movement toward machine learning techniques); Marion Fourcade and Kieran
42
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raises the possibility that algorithmic fair use parameters might
not have to be explicitly defined and coded. Empirical investigation of the corpus of fair use decisions from federal courts suggests
that fair use outcomes are neither random nor unpredictable but
may follow particular patterns of judicial decision-making. 47 One
can imagine that a neural network or other machine learning system could detect these or other patterns in the data surrounding
past cases, matching them to similar patterns in the data surrounding future fair use incidents, situations, and scenarios without formal programming definition of the fair use factors. 48 Such
a system might provide the kind of fair use assessments envisioned by the Ninth Circuit, if not prior to the actual use, at least
in conjunction with online copyright enforcement decisions.
While such algorithmic decision-making would lower the immediate cost associated with fair use balancing and may be, as
the court observes, the only feasible way to deal with petabytes of
online content, it cannot be expected to eliminate the costs associated with fair use determinations. 49 As I suggest in this Essay,
it would at best reallocate such costs. Law and attendant legal
institutions are embedded in a complex web of sociotechnical actors; technological realignment of costs in one section of the network inevitably results in realignment throughout other sections
of the network. 50 Costs do not disappear; they are redistributed.
As the saying goes, there is no free lunch, and pressing down on
the network at one point inevitably causes protrusion at some

Healy, Seeing Like a Market, 15 Socio-Econ Rev 9, 24 (2017) (observing that artificial intelligence research abandoned the idea of machines that can think in favor of machines
that can learn).
47 See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 Ohio St L J 47, 75–81 (2012); Barton
Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U Pa L Rev
549, 594–621 (2008). See also generally Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77
Fordham L Rev 2537 (2009) (arguing that fair use decisions fall into regularized patterns).
48 See Elkin-Koren, 64 UCLA L Rev at 1096–97 (cited in note 6) (speculating about
this type of fair use algorithm). Ironically, because machine learning techniques inevitably
involve the digital reproduction of training content, algorithmic fair use may be dependent
on the fair use doctrine in order to acquire and process the materials needed to learn fair
use. See Benjamin L.W. Sobel, Artificial Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis, 41 Colum J L &
Arts 45, 80–81 (2017) (discussing the dependence of artificial intelligence learning on fair
use); Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit
Bias Problem, 93 Wash L Rev 579, 619–29 (2018) (same). See also James Grimmelmann,
Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 Iowa L Rev 657, 665–67 (2016) (arguing that large-scale
robotic scanning or copying is permissible as a fair use).
49 See Felten, 46 Commun ACM at 58–59 (cited in note 39).
50 See Bryan Pfaffenberger, Technological Dramas, 17 Sci, Tech & Hum Values 282,
291 (1992).
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other point. Rather than imagining that costs vanish, it is imperative to estimate where, and to whom, and in what form they will
occur.
IV. THE SOCIAL COST OF ALGORITHMS
There already exists a fairly large body of literature attempting to determine, predict, and assess the social impact and cost of
algorithmic governance. Professor Tarleton Gillespie, in an influential article, encapsulates and categorizes several social effects
that are already apparent in algorithmic deployment. 51 Such effects entail hidden or unexpected costs of algorithmic deployment:
!

!

!

!

51
52
53
54
55

Patterns of Inclusion: “Big data” does not simply mean a
lot of data; data must be collected, structured, and
groomed for processing. The explicit or implicit biases of
these procedures, including the choice of what data are included or excluded before algorithmic processing, are determinative of algorithmic output. 52
Cycles of Anticipation: Data processing routines are structured with particular audiences and purposes in mind;
they are tailored and retailored according to predicted
uses. Such predictive designs determine who is likely to
find the output useful, and the characteristics of the user
pool recursively shape future updates to the algorithm. 53
Evaluation of Relevance: Presentation of algorithmic output
necessarily entails assignment of relevance; assigned relevance is meaningful only when adopted by users. Data processing routines thus effectively enact policy choices through
their determination of what is relevant or irrelevant. 54
Illusion of Objectivity: Design and execution of algorithmic
processes are typically hidden from their audience. Machinegenerated outputs thus appear to materialize without human bias, often creating the unwarranted perception of
impartiality and objectivity. This perception further obscures the origins and the biases of the algorithm, lending
it unwarranted authority. 55

See generally Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms (cited in note 2).
See id at 169–72.
See id at 172–75.
See id at 175–79.
See Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms at 179–82 (cited in note 2).
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Patterns of Entanglement: Audiences will inevitably alter
their behavior under the influence of the algorithms they
depend on, and these behavioral changes then impact the
data and data relationships that form the inputs to the
same algorithms, a mirrored parallel to the cycles of anticipation in design. 56
Production of Calculated Publics: Presentation of algorithmic results to an entangled public reshapes the public’s
sense of self, propriety, and purpose. But the audience expectation embedded in algorithmic systems may be taken
up by other institutions—by courts, schools, businesses,
legislatures—reinforcing both the social position of the algorithm and its assumptions about its audience. 57

In this Essay, I am primarily concerned with the latter two
issues, although these concatenated effects are deeply intertwined and the preceding four topics are undoubtedly also matters of serious concern. There is no question that the open and
hidden biases introduced in the construction of algorithmic systems are bound to have an effect on their social relevance. 58 As
Professor N. Katherine Hayles points out, the products of data
processing have no inherent meaning; they require some explanatory narrative that lends them significance. 59 Thus, as Professor
Malte Ziewitz explains, algorithms are developed in terms of the
problem they are expected to address, and so their design is inevitably framed in terms of a particular narrative about the algorithm’s purpose. 60 Such “ontological gerrymandering” manipulates the boundary between the problematic and unproblematic
by presenting selected assumptions about the problem as given or
by cloaking their presence altogether. 61
It is therefore somewhat alarming to read legal commentators who confidently assert that “human decision makers are

56

See id at 183–88.
See id at 188–91.
58 See Anton Vedder and Laurens Naudts, Accountability for the Use of Algorithms
in a Big Data Environment, 31 Intl Rev L Computers & Tech 206, 208–09 (2017).
59 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis 176 (Chicago 2012).
60 Malte Ziewitz, How to Think about an Algorithm: Notes from a Not Quite Random
Walk *10 (draft discussion paper, Sept 29, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/S3CZ-866V.
See also Hayles, How We Think at 176 (cited in note 60) (observing that database outputs
acquire meaning only with narrative explanation).
61 Steve Woolgar and Dorothy Pawluch, Ontological Gerrymandering: The Anatomy
of Social Problems Explanations, 32 Soc Problems 214, 217–18 (1985).
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flawed and biased. The biases and inconsistencies found in individual judgments can largely be washed away using advanced
data analytics.” 62 On the contrary, the observation that “[r]aw
data is . . . an oxymoron,” famously coined by Professor Geoffrey
Bowker in his influential work on scientific classification, 63 has
become something of a catchphrase among critical analysts of big
data and its attendant algorithmic processes. The data are always
cooked, before algorithmic processing and certainly during algorithmic processing, as indeed they must be in order to be useful
in any way. 64 The question is never whether the data are biased
but rather how, by whom, and for what purposes.
When the four factors of the fair use standard are concerned,
many of the points at which such design choices must be made
quickly become obvious. Determining the impact of the unauthorized use of a work on the actual or potential market for the underlying work requires a model of the market and decisions about
the data that properly populate that model. The amount of the
work used can be mapped to the percentage of lines or words or
pixels or bits taken for a given use, but some weight or significance must be accorded to that number, whether defined by explicit programming values or by algorithmically learned data patterns. The type of work used and the use to which the protected
taking is put require some categorization of works and uses.
These and a multitude of other design choices made in advance
would determine the allowance or disallowance of uses for protected content; algorithms do not make judgments; they are rather the products of human judgment.
The need for human interpretation stems from the disjunction between data representation and reality: the correlations
found by data mining algorithms have meaning within the formal
62 Casey and Niblett, 66 U Toronto L J at 437 (cited in note 19). While this rather
astonishing assertion lacks any citation to supporting authority, one possible source could
be Professor Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, who have similarly claimed
that the completeness of big data sets obviates the messiness of the data. Viktor MayerSchönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We
Live, Work, and Think 33–35 (Houghton Mifflin 2013). This claim has been strongly criticized as inaccurate by a number of subsequent commentators. See, for example, Carl
Lagoze, Big Data, Data Integrity, and the Fracturing of the Control Zone, 1 Big Data &
Society *5 (July–Dec 2014); S. Leonelli, What Difference Does Quantity Make? On the Epistemology of Big Data in Biology, 1 Big Data & Society *6–8 (Apr–June 2014).
63 Geoffrey C. Bowker, Memory Practices in the Sciences 184 (MIT 2005) (“Raw data
is both an oxymoron and a bad idea; to the contrary, data should be cooked with care.”).
64 See Lisa Gitelman and Virginia Jackson, Introduction, in Lisa Gitelman, ed, “Raw
Data” Is an Oxymoron 1, 3 (MIT 2013).
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properties of the data set but have unknown significance outside
the data set. 65 Thus, for example, facial recognition algorithms,
employed to further security, law enforcement, immigration
screening, and other purposes, have been much discussed in relation to algorithmic governance. 66 But as computer scientist Bill
Smart reminds us, such systems are not in fact “face detectors,”
they are actually “set-of-pixel-values-that-often-correlate-wellwith-the-presence-of-faces-in-the-training-data-that-you-collecteddetector[s].” 67 Similarly, fair use algorithms would be more accurately understood as something like “patterns-of-numerical-valuesthat-often-correlate-well-with-similar-patterns-of-numerical-valuesrelated-to-judicial-findings-of-fair-use-in-the-training-data-thatyou-collected-detectors.” Patterns detected by a machine evaluating fair use–related data should not be confused with a legal institutional determination of fair use.
Thus, again, algorithms do not make judgments; they are the
products and the tools of human judgments. Human narrative
may be baked into the system ex ante or it may be assigned to the
output ex post, but at some point someone must put policy and
ideology to work to declare the numbers relevant. 68 Data analysis
may indicate that certain data occurrences coincide, but the explanation as to why this occurs is a human narrative or categorization, not a technical determination. 69 Thus, when data mining
(in one famous example) shows a strong correlation between
movements in the S&P 500 Stock Index and the production of butter in Bangladesh, a human decisionmaker is required to designate the trend as spurious rather than meaningful. 70
Equally problematic is the realization that fair use is not a
static concept. Even if the engineering vision of fair use, whether

65 See Dourish, 3 Big Data & Society at *7 (cited in note 2); Elish and boyd, Commun
Monographs at 70 (cited in note 22) (developing machine-readable code is “not about a
search for meaning, but about the construction and depiction of statistical models”).
66 See generally Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya, and Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual
Lineup: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America (Georgetown Law Center on Privacy
& Technology, Oct 18, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/L3CC-BNS6 (discussing use of
facial recognition algorithms).
67 See Elish and boyd, Commun Monographs at 69–70 (cited in note 22) (quoting Smart).
68 See boyd and Crawford, 15 Info, Commun & Society at 667–68 (cited in note 7).
See also John Symons and Ramón Alvarado, Can We Trust Big Data? Applying Philosophy
of Science to Software, 3 Big Data & Society at *4–6 (July–Dec 2016) (discussing the epistemic difficulties in error correction for big data systems).
69 See Dourish, 3 Big Data & Society at *7–8 (cited in note 2).
70 See David J. Leinweber, Stupid Data Miner Tricks: Overfitting the S&P 500, 16 J
Investing 15, 16 (2007).
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it is in defined programming values or as machine learned patterns, is somehow entirely faithful to the relevant legal doctrines,
we are left with the question as to exactly which version of fair
use is being instantiated in the machine. The common law
evolves, whether from purely judicial reasoning or from judicial
riffing off of legislative enactments. Fair use today does not look
entirely like it has in the past, either as it did as a common law
doctrine prior to its 1976 statutory codification or as it did when
codified by Congress. Neither has the codified version remained
static, as the Supreme Court has added a variety of judicial
glosses, most notably the concept of transformativity. 71 No doubt
the official, judicially articulated understanding of the doctrine’s
character can be expected to continue to change in the face of developing technical and social circumstances.
Thus, one concern that could stem from the dynamic legal nature of fair use is whether automated instantiation of fair use
freezes the standard as of the time it was encoded, so that the law
and the algorithm diverge. The algorithm could of course be updated to learn or incorporate shifts in the legal standard. But far
from preventing divergence, updating almost assures it. Whether
to incorporate new data or to accommodate new equipment, digital processes require continual updating that create unexpected
dynamism as the deployed algorithm evolves. 72 Maintenance and
upgrades to the system inevitably deviate from the expectations
of the original design. This is a source of inconsistency, as are the
multiple serendipitous interactions of the particular algorithm
with other hardware, software, and devices with their ongoing
updates. 73
To be sure, one might argue that judicial determinations of
fair use factors requires the same set of judgments, and no matter
what a judge may articulate in her written opinion, the actual
process of judicial reasoning is never fully transparent. 74 But as
Professor Lawrence Lessig long ago pointed out, when technical
design is effectively legal regulation, the major difference between legal code and computer code may be that the latter type of
regulation devolves policy choices from the hands of publicly accountable officials to those of largely invisible and unaccountable
71

See Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 US 569, 579 (1994).
See Dourish, 3 Big Data & Society at *8–9 (cited in note 2) (discussing the coevolution of algorithms and data sets as implemented).
73 Id at *9.
74 See Casey and Niblett, 66 U Toronto L J at 437 (cited in note 19).
72
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software engineers. 75 Or as Professor McKenzie Wark suggested,
technology is merely politics by different means; when speaking
of the technical or of the political, one is speaking of the same
systems viewed through different lenses. 76 Political, ideological,
and even unconscious biases are well understood to permeate traditional legal codes developed in the legislative arena, but they
are equally present in deployment of computer code developed in
the technical arena.
V. INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE REDUX
To guard against intentional or unintentional algorithmic error, the natural suggestion is to require some degree of human
oversight. 77 And thus, the suggestion of automated fair use assessment, notwithstanding any changes in machine learning
technology, circles back to the finding by Professor Cohen and myself nearly twenty years ago that automated fair use systems require human institutional oversight. 78 But once again we are confronted with the observation of Professor Paul Dourish and others
that algorithms may be best regarded as “convening” objects79
that interact with a complex ecology of hardware, software, social

75 See Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 99 (Basic 1999). See also
generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules through Technology, 76 Tex L Rev 553 (1997) (discussing implementations of regulation through technology); Bruno Latour, Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology
of a Few Mundane Artifacts, in Wiebe Bijker and John Law, eds, Shaping TechnologyBuilding Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change 225 (MIT 1992) (discussing the behavioral imperatives embedded in technical design).
76 McKenzie Wark, #Celerity: A Critique of the Manifesto for an Accelerated Politics
¶ 3.7 (Speculative Heresy, May 14, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/2YKW-X5NA. See
also Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High
Technology 29 (Chicago 1986) (“[T]echnological innovations are similar to legislative acts
or political foundings that establish a framework for public order.”).
77 See Elkin-Koren, 64 UCLA L Rev at 1098 (cited in note 6) (suggesting such mixed
oversight in the context of automated removal decisions).
78 See Burk and Cohen, 15 Harv J L & Tech at 59 (cited in note 38). See also Erickson
and Mulligan, 92 Proceedings of the IEEE at 993–94 (cited in note 40) (discussing the
prospects for integrating algorithmic and human oversight of fair use). Professor Yeung
argues that such institutional oversight is a generalized requirement for regulation by
design. See Yeung, Toward an Understanding of Regulation by Design at 93–94 (cited in
note 28).
79 Dourish, 3 Big Data & Society at *3 (cited in note 2), quoting Mike Annany, Toward an Ethics of Algorithms: Convening, Observation, Probability, and Timeliness, 41
Sci, Tech & Hum Values 93, 100–02 (2016).
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institutions, and human actors. 80 The social impact of algorithmic
fair use depends on the assemblage of actions and actors that are
tied together in such an infrastructure. We should therefore consider closely how any putative fair use detector came into existence and consider what entities have the motivation and the resources to construct such a system.
Designing, maintaining, repairing, gathering, curating, and
updating a database and its attendant algorithm are not costless
activities. 81 They are, to the contrary, likely to be expensive as
standalone activities, or might constitute marginal costs related
to the investment in a larger undertaking. Copyright algorithms
are currently deployed, as the Ninth Circuit underscores in its
Lenz dictum, in order to manage the overwhelming job of policing
digital content. 82 In the vision of algorithmic fair use casually articulated by the Ninth Circuit, the fair use algorithm might constitute part of a good faith effort by content owners to evaluate
likely infringement. 83 Alternatively, one could imagine service
providers, such as Google or Facebook, creating and deploying algorithmic fair use as part of their effort to comply with their responsibilities under the Copyright Act and to justify their decisions to remove or allow content on their platforms. Far less likely
is any scenario in which the users or consumers of copyrighted
content deploy a fair use algorithm, or even in which fair users
would have any hand in designing or crafting the systems that
assess the applicability of the exemption to their activities.
Given the inordinate cost associated with reviewing online
content for infringement, what type of human oversight might we
expect from the likely originators of automated fair use assessment? Would human oversight guard against Type I or Type II
error? 84 False algorithmic fair use positives are the likely concern
of content holders, whereas false algorithmic fair use negatives
are most detrimental to the public good. Screening for both types
of error would effectively mean human review of every algorithmic
80 Dourish, 3 Big Data & Society at *3 (cited in note 2); Daniel Neyland and Norma
Möllers, Algorithmic IF . . . THEN Rules and the Conditions and Consequences of Power,
20 Info, Commun & Society 45, 47 (2017).
81 See Elish and boyd, Commun Monographs at 69 (cited in note 22).
82 Lenz, 801 F3d at 1135.
83 See notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
84 See J. Neyman and E.S. Pearson, The Testing of Statistical Hypotheses in Relation
to Probabilities a Priori, 29 Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Phil Society 492,
497–98 (1933) (labeling false positives and false negatives rejecting null hypotheses as
Type I or Type II errors, respectively).

2019]

Algorithmic Fair Use

301

decision, negating any cost advantage from the algorithmic review,
and so is utterly implausible. The statute considered in Lenz clearly
contemplates human decision-making in the formation of a “good
faith belief,” 85 and judicial enforcement of that expectation might
require human review before a takedown demand; but this does
not address algorithmic policing of uploads, downloads, or access.86
Certainly, content owners are no more likely to engage expert human oversight of fair use analysis than they do now for automated
decision-making regarding content blocking or removal.
In other contexts, the idea of third party audits for algorithmic decisions has been advanced. 87 But ex ante assessment of intended or unintended biases will prove difficult or impossible.
Transparency of algorithmic systems is obscured in at least three
different interlocking dimensions. 88 First is the explicit or intentional obscurity stemming from trade secrecy and protection of
confidential business information—to the extent that algorithms
are commissioned or developed by commercial entities, they may
attempt to shield proprietary aspects of the technology from misappropriation or competitive copying. 89 A second barrier to transparency stems from the esoteric nature of the technology, requiring technical expertise to understand its workings. Even if the
code is openly available, judges and lay consumers are unlikely to
understand how the algorithm operates, so any assessment of the
technology’s operation or suitability is at best reliant on expert
interpretation and translation of the algorithm’s features into understandable lay terms.
Third, and closely related to the point regarding updates: the
complexity of the algorithm in operation creates opacity. Even if
the system is entirely open to inspection by experts, the experts
are unlikely to understand how it operates. 90 Because machine
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Lenz, 801 F3d at 1135.
See generally Bridy, Copyright’s Digital Deputies (cited in note 4). As Professor
Annemarie Bridy has documented in some detail, the statutory notice and takedown procedure
considered in Lenz has morphed into a network of voluntary filtering, blocking, and removal
practices that are cheaper and more convenient for the businesses involved. Id at 195–98.
87 See generally, for example, Pasquale, The Black Box Society (cited in note 3) (arguing for audits of search engine and financial accounting algorithms).
88 See Jenna Burrell, How the Machine “Thinks”: Understanding Opacity in Machine
Learning Algorithms, 3 Big Data & Society *9 (Jan–June 2016) (questioning the likely
value and efficacy of proposed algorithmic audits).
89 This is a central and signature concern of Professor Frank Pasquale’s analysis.
See Pasquale, The Black Box Society at 4 (cited in note 3).
90 Id at 6–7.
86
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learning codes for routines and leaves the routine to develop values, it is often impossible to predict or even to know what the machine has learned. 91 Additionally, the algorithm itself is embedded in a larger technical structure, including other software and
hardware components that will affect its operation, often in unexpected or inscrutable ways. 92 Thus, when Google’s image recognition algorithm infamously labeled pictures of African American
people as “gorillas,” it might have been due to some unconscious
racial bias in the training data, or it might have been due to some
kind of bias in the system design, or it might have been an unfortunate but inadvertent occurrence caused by a random technical
glitch somewhere in the system. 93 But the most significant lesson
from the debacle, whatever the origin of the offensive output, may
be that the only solution was to block the system from labeling
any image as a “gorilla” because Google’s technical staff simply
had no ability to locate, isolate, or remedy the source of the problem. 94
VI. SELF-FULFILLING ALGORITHMS
Because the technical limitations I briefly sketch above are
opaque, there is a strong tendency for them to remain invisible
and unconsidered, and the lack of apparent limits lends to the
machine a magical aura of automated objectivity. And yet the limitations will be there, preventing automation of what we now call
fair use. While we should be deeply concerned with these inevitable
biases that attend algorithmic design and implementation as well
as with the distracting myth of algorithmic objectivity, my primary concern here is with their combination to produce recursive
biases that change public practice and so change social meaning.
As I note above, this type of effect is already seen in the algorithmic copyright policing of online content, in which the algorithmic
removal action has become a de facto finding of infringement, the
public has begun to internalize such outcomes, and formal copyright law may be incorporating those expectations into its weft. 95
As one video creator has described the development of an online
guide to moviemaking:
91

See Burrell, 3 Big Data & Society at *11 n 17 (cited in note 89).
See id at *5.
93 See id at *7.
94 See Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy, Categories All the Way Down, 42 Hist Soc
Rsrch 286, 293–94 (2017).
95 See Sag, 93 Notre Dame L Rev at 503 (cited in note 4).
92
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You could make a video that meets the criteria for fair use,
but YouTube could still take it down because of their internal
system (Copyright ID) which analyzes and detects copyrighted material.
So I learned to edit my way around that system.
Nearly every stylistic decision you see about the channel—
the length of the clips, the number of examples, which studios’ films we chose, the way narration and clip audio weave
together, the reordering and flipping of shots, the remixing of
5.1 audio, the rhythm and pacing of the overall video—all of
that was reverse-engineered from YouTube’s Copyright ID.
I spent about a week doing brute force trial-and-error. I
would privately upload several different essay clips, then see
which got flagged and which didn’t. This gave me a rough
idea what the system could detect, and I edited the videos to
avoid those potholes. 96
Whatever form algorithmic fair use might take would likely become a similar social, legal, and creative default.
The effective loss of any user exceptions in current online copyright enforcement might be seen to favor incorporation of some
approximation of fair use into policing algorithms, however far it
may depart from the actual legal grant to users, on the theory
that occasional and biased user access is better than none. 97 I
have become increasingly chary of such interventions, however
well-intentioned. We have some historic experience with the effect of fair use approximations in the context of old-fashioned,
nonautomated legal formulas. In the context of the 1976 revision
of the US Copyright Act, educators, publishers, and other stakeholders met to discuss the application of fair use standards to the

96 Tony Zhou, Postmortem: Every Frame a Painting (Medium, Dec 2, 2017), archived
at http://perma.cc/U5WU-M6ZZ. Hat tip to Professor James Grimmelmann for pointing
out this example.
97 See Burk and Cohen, 15 Harv J L & Tech at 65 (cited in note 38) (suggesting that
some de minimis access rules might be incorporated into digital rights management algorithms). See also Barbara L. Fox and Brian A. LaMacchia, Encouraging Recognition of
Fair Uses in DRM Systems, 46 Commun ACM 61, 62–63 (2003) (advocating inclusion of
“safe harbor” uses in digital rights management algorithms).
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photocopying of classroom materials. 98 After considerable discussion, the groups reported to the relevant congressional committee
that they had agreed on certain guidelines for photocopying.
The guidelines were not enacted into law, nor endorsed or approved by Congress, although they were discussed in committee
reports. 99 Rather, the guidelines were effectively an agreed-upon
metric, conformity with which would be considered by the group
to be “fair” and so excused from infringement liability. For example, the guidelines specified that material taken without authorization must be brief and offered definitions of permissible “brevity” for various types of works literary, such as:
!
!

!

A complete poem if less than 250 words and if printed on
not more than two pages or from a longer poem, an excerpt
of not more than 250 words. 100
Either a complete article, story or essay of less than 2,500
words, or an excerpt from any prose work of not more than
1,000 words or 10 percent of the work, whichever is less,
but in any event a minimum of 500 words. 101
Each of the numerical limits stated above may be expanded to permit the completion of an unfinished line of a
poem or of an unfinished prose paragraph. 102

Note that, under the statutory test, these metrics might or
might not be deemed “fair.” Depending on the circumstances, 250
words from a poem might fall within the statutory determination
of “fair,” or 250 words might be too much. Certainly, many uses
not recognized within such guidelines would be fair under the
statute. The guidelines comprised a set of simple, discrete, quantitative (and, not coincidentally, eminently programmable) substitutions of private rules for the statutory standard, offering certainty rather than flexibility.
Despite the fact that they were not legally required, and copyright users were likely entitled to more than the guidelines offered,

98 See Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 Ohio St L J 599, 615–18 (2001); Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright:
Reclaiming the Right to Photocopy Freely, 60 U Pitt L Rev 149, 149–63 (1998).
99 See Crews, 62 Ohio St L J at 636 (cited in note 99).
100 Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, HR Rep No 94-1476, 98th Cong, 2d Sess
68 (1976).
101 Id at 68–69.
102 Id at 69.
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the guidelines quickly found considerable purchase with copyright users, who were often advised by their employers or by professional societies to remain within the guidelines in order to
avoid the uncertainties of the actual statute’s multifactor calculus. This is perhaps not surprising, as the discrete metrics of the
guidelines were easier to communicate and to understand than
the inchoate factors of the actual legal test. Somewhat more surprisingly, the guidelines began to show up in infringement litigation, were cited by copyright owners as marking the boundaries
of fair use, and were adopted by some courts as indicative of fair
use. 103 Fair use analysis is costly in terms of judicial resources, and
the guidelines offered a ready-made rule for some judges to use.
In short, implementation of algorithmic fair use will inevitably, and probably detrimentally, change the nature of fair use.104
Much as in the historical case of the fair use guidelines, we should
expect that the deployment of any algorithm purporting to assess
fair use would engage strong incentives toward the adoption of a
quick and easy substitute for a complicated legal test. Adoption
might be explicit, as in the case of the fair use guidelines, or tacit,
as courts and the public internalize the activity of the algorithm.
Indeed, our experience to date with algorithmic systems suggests
that the incentives toward de facto definition of fair use as equivalent to its automated doppelganger would be much stronger. In
practice then, whatever choices or biases, inclusions or exclusions, expectations or oversights were engineered into the algorithm would become a self-fulfilling prophecy as to the nature of
fair use.
Thus, the problem is not so much the concern advanced by
Professor Roger Brownsword that regulation such as fair use by
design forecloses a population’s moral and normative choices,105
as the concern is that the moral and normative choices embraced
by the population are informed, manufactured, and ultimately
103

See Crews, 62 Ohio St L at 662–63 (cited in note 99) (summarizing judicial uses of
the guidelines).
104 See Deirdre K. Mulligan, John Han, and Aaron J. Burstein, How DRM-Based Content Delivery Systems Disrupt Expectations of “Personal Use”, DRM 2003: Proceedings of
the Third ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management 77, 85 (2003) (arguing that digital rights management constraints may change consumer expectations for personal use
of secured content).
105 See Roger Brownsword, Disruptive Agents and Our Onlife World: Should We Be
Concerned, 4 Critical Analysis L 61, 66–67 (2017). See also Dan L. Burk and Tarleton Gillespie,
Autonomy and Morality in DRM and Anti-circumvention Law, 4 Triple C: Cognition Commun
Cooperation 239, 241 (2006) (arguing that technical copyright protections impact user
autonomy).
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distorted by the architecture of regulation. Indeed, Professor
Mireille Hildebrandt has suggested that algorithmic technologies
cannot support, and may be inimical to, the public values that are
fundamental to democratic and civil society. 106 Machine learning
may seem a novelty, and technology may have changed, but basic
human nature and institutional practice have not. Careful consideration of these and related effects are necessarily part of any
realistic assessment of algorithmic fair use—or indeed of any
movement toward automated governance.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion compelled by our current understanding of algorithmic governance is stark but real. I have outlined two possible roads ahead, and on neither of them does it appear that viable
fair use survives intact in the algorithmic twenty-first century.107
Failure to incorporate fair use into copyright enforcement algorithms likely means the de facto loss of the fair use exception,
making it available only as a rarified defense to the few litigants
who can afford to persevere until favorable judicial review. However, the alternative of attempting to incorporate fair use into enforcement algorithms threatens to degrade the exception into an
unrecognizable form. Worse yet, social internalization of a bowdlerized version of fair use deployed in algorithmic format is likely
to become the new legal and social norm. We can of course try to
shoehorn some type of infringement forgiveness into enforcement
algorithms, and we might even label such mechanized user latitude “fair use,” but it will not resemble fair use or serve the goals
of fair use, in any sense that we now know them.
Essentially, because fair use cannot be automated, algorithmic fair use simply cannot be fair use at all. There is perhaps
some cold comfort, when drawing upon the very deep literature
examining algorithmic governance, to realize that this situation
is not unique either to fair use in particular nor to copyright in
general. The reality of what Professor Jack Balkin has called the
“Algorithmic Society” 108 is that these processes are operating
106 Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law: Novel Entanglements of Law and Technology 184–85 (Edward Elgar 2015).
107 But see Elkin-Koren, 64 UCLA L Rev at 1100 (cited in note 6) (advocating the
development of fair use algorithms for the twenty-first century).
108 Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 UC Davis L Rev 1149, 1151 (2018). See also
Ian Bogost, The Cathedral of Computation (The Atlantic, Jan 15, 2015), archived at
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across vast swaths of legal governance, from privacy to consumer
welfare to freedom of speech. 109 In the little corner of the world
concerned with copyright, it has been clear for some time that
copyright in the information age is probably not fulfilling its mandate of encouraging authors while promoting human flourishing; 110 the dysfunction inherent in algorithmic copyright is only
the latest sign of a system in dissolution.
It should, therefore, come as no surprise that the fair use
component of copyright is no more amenable to automation than
is the overall copyright system itself. Moreover, I have focused
here only on the difficulties of algorithmic fair use, but similar
difficulties would attend automation of the idea/expression distinction, 111 exhaustion, 112 functionality, 113 and other doctrines that
likely do far more than fair use to control the shape and scope of
copyright. Rather than attempting to salvage the accustomed analog copyright balance by substituting some changeling form of
fair use for the familiar doctrine, the reality of algorithmic governance may instead mean radically rethinking the goals of copyright as a whole.

http://perma.cc/3K2G-FCNN (“We’re not living in an algorithmic culture so much as a
computational theocracy.”).
109 See generally Pasquale, The Black Box Society (cited in note 3). See also Joshua A.
Kroll, et al, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U Pa L Rev 633, 678–94 (2017) (attempting to
articulate general principles of accountability for algorithmic regulation).
110 The literature grappling with this problem is now immense, but a sampling of major
works would include Hector Postigo, The Digital Rights Movement: The Role of Technology
in Subverting Digital Copyright (MIT 2012); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright 2.0 and You (Oxford 2011); Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive
in the Hybrid Economy (Penguin 2008); Tarleton Gillespie, Wired Shut: Copyright and the
Shape of Digital Culture (MIT 2007); Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Prometheus 2001).
111 See Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger Doctrine, 63 J Copyright Society 417, 419 (2016).
112 See Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L Rev
889, 912 (2011).
113 See Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from
the Scope of Its Protection, 85 Tex L Rev 1921, 1951–52 (2007).

